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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPOUSE ACT-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OF

BOTH HUSBAND AND WIF--The General Court (Legislature) of
Massachusetts submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court of the
state for its advisory opinion six bills relating to the employment
of married persons by the state or by certain of its local subdivisions. Some of the bills referred to persons already employed
2
by the state;1 others were directed solely at future employment.
Two of the bills forbade concurrent employment of husband and
wife. The remaining measures related specifically to the employment of married women in the service of the state. In one form
of language or another, the bills excepted from their operation
those married women whose husbands were unable to support
them.4 One bill was designed to exclude from future employment
any females where there is a marital status in existence regardless, apparently, of the question of support by the husband. 5
In a sweeping opinion, the majority of the court held the bills
Corp. v. Rhode, 122 Conn. 100, 187 AtL. 676 (1936); In re Shannahan and
Wrightson Hardware Co., 118 At. 599 (Del. 1922); Hopkins v. Hemsley, 53
Idaho 120, 22 P. (2d) 138 (1933); First National Bank v. Ripley, 204 Iowa
590, 215 N.W. 647 (1927); Perkins v. National Bond and Inv. Co., 224 Ky. 65,
5 S.W. (2d) 475 (1928); Silver v. McDonald, 172 Minn. 458, 215 N.W. 844
(1927); National Bank of Commerce v. Morris, 114 Mo. 255, 21 S.W. 511, 19
L.R.A. 463, 35 Am. St. Rep. 754 (1893); Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v.
Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N.W. 827, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 95, Am. Cas. 1914B,
1250 (1913); Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N.M. 267, 21 P.
(2d) 96, 87 A.L.R. 962 (1933); Wilson v. Rustad, 7 N.D. 330, 75 N.W. 260, 66
Am. St. Rep. 649 (1898); Kerfoot v. State Bank of Waterloo, 14 Okla. 104, 77
Pac. 46 (1904).
1. House Bills Nos. 292, 707, 893, 1408 and 1705 of the Gen. Ct. of Mass.
cited in In re Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E. (2d) 49, 58 (Mass. 1939).
2. House Bills Nos. 893 (§ 2) and 1408 (§ 2), cited in 22 N.E. (2d) at 54.
3. House Bill No. 556 provides that "... . A husband and wife shall not
at the same time be employed in the service of the commonwealth ..
" 22
N.E. (2d) at 58.
House Bill No. 707 provides that "...
those female persons . . . whose
husbands are also employed by the city of Lowell . . ." shall be excluded
from public employment. 22 N.E. (2d) at 58.
4. House Bill No. 292 was designed to exclude any married woman unless
. her husband is earning less than three thousand dollars per year or
... she is living apart from her husband for justifiable cause . . ." 22 N.E.
(2d) at 58.
House Bill No. 893 would have excluded from employment every married
woman unless her spouse ". . . either through physical or mental disability
is unable to support her, or, by court decree is not bound to provide her
support . . ." 22 N.E. (2d) at 58.
House Bill No. 1408 and House Bill No. 1705 excluded from employment
all married women ". . . whose husbands are capable of accepting permanent
employment . . ." but excepted from its application married women ". .
whose husbands are permanently disabled by reason of mental or physical
illness ..
" 22 N.E. (2d) at 58.
5. House Bill No. 707. But in case of those already employed
it would
permit continued employment of those ". . . whose husbands by reason of
mental or physical incapacity are unable to provide for their wives and
children and who are without sufficient funds or income to support their
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unconstitutional in their entirety. A minority of two justices distinguished between an enactment which sought to bar all married
women from governmental employment and one which restricted
such discrimination to women whose husbands were able to support them. They were of the opinion that only the former type of
bill was unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E. (2d) 49
(Mass. 1939).
It is a settled rule that the state and its governmental agencies have broad powers over employment of persons in the public
service.6 No public employee can acquire a vested contract right
denying authority of the state to terminate such employment if
it is at will;7 but if the employee has a contract with the state, the
statutory abrogation of his contract would be an impairment of
the obligation of contract in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Statutory regulation of selection of persons for public service
being primarily based on qualifications for the performance of
duties necessary to the office sought,9 the state cannot by legislative enactment arbitrarily classify its citizens and favor one class
to the exclusion of others in the public employment.' 0 Preference
to veterans in public employment has been held not to be arbitrary discrimination because such priority is deemed to promote patriotism and to be a reward for past services rendered in
defense of the country. 1
not engaged in
wives aud children . . ." and those whose husbands are "...
" 22 N.E. (2d) at 58.
a gainful occupation ..
6. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. 402, 13 L.Ed. 472 (1850); United States
v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143, 3 S.Ct. 154, 27 L.Ed. 885 (1883); Phelps v. Board of
Education, 300 U.S. 319, 57 S.Ct. 483, 81 L.Ed. 674 (1937); Higginbotham v.
Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 59 S.Ct. 705, 83 L.Ed. 968 (1939). See also Mississippi v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174, 176, 48 S.Ct. 266, 72 L.Ed. 517 (1923).
7. Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 25 L.Ed. 710 (1879); Crenshaw
v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 10 S.Ct. 431, 33 L.Ed. 825 (1890); Dodge v. Board
of Education, 302 U.S. 74, 58 S.Ct. 98, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937); Higginbotham v.
Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 59 S.Ct. 705, 83 L.Ed. 968 (1939). See also Phelps
v. Board of Education, 300 U.S. 319, 322, 57 S.Ct. 483, 81 L.Ed. 674 (1937).
8. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5, 26 L.Ed. 302 (1870); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938).
9. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900);
Dever v. Humprey, 68 Kan. 759, 75 Pac. 1037, 1 Ann. Cas. 293 (1904); State
v. Cocking, 66 Mont. 169, 213 Pac. 594, 28 A.L.R. 772 (1923); People v. Robb,
55 Hun. 425, 8 N.Y. Supp. 502 (1890).
10. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 161-163, 108 N.E. 427, 429-430 L.R.A.
1916D, 550; Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254 (1915).
11. Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa 128, 104 N.W. 1121, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)
825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039 (1905); Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 75 Pac. 1034,
64 L.R.A. 945, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 1 Ann. Cas. 2?8 (1904); Opinion of the
Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 44 N.E. 625, 34 L.R.A. 58 (1896); State v. Miller, 66
Minn. 90, 68 N.W. 732 (1896). Contra: Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N.Y. 435, 132
N.E. 140, 16 A.L.R. 1404 (1921).
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Since women, whether married or unmarried, are citizens of
the state and are entitled to the benefits of constitutional guaranties against arbitrary discrimination,1 2 they cannot be excluded
from employment in public service unless their exclusion would
tend to promote public welfare or unless the employment of a
particular class of citizens to be favored would have a direct
relation to the public interest.18 In some jurisdictions, married
women as a class have been found to be disqualified as teachers
in the public schools, apparently without stated reasons or on the
grounds that such an exclusion promotes efficiency in the school
14
system.
The general principle that evils arising from unemployment
warrant relief by legislation within constitutional limits is undoubted. 15 However, in the principal case the court indicated that
the bills fell outside this area of permissable regulation, inasmuch
as they failed to deal with the entire problem of unemployment
among unmarried women and since the consequence of the proposed legislation would be to furnish employment to unmarried
women at the expense of married women. The statutory preference, said the court, was attempted legislation "for the mere
advantage of particular individuals and not for the protection of
a basic interest of society.' 6 The exclusion of all married women
from public employment has no reasonable relation to the public
health, safety and welfare.?7
12. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165-177,
22 L.Ed. 627 (1875).
13. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 161-163, 108 N.E. 427, 429-430, L.R.A.
1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254 (1915).
14. McQuaid v. State, 211 Ind. 595, 6 N.E. (2d) 547 (1937); Sheldon v.
School Committee, 276 Mass. 230, 177 N.E. 94 (1931); State v. Board of School
Directors, 225 Wis. 444, 274 N.W. 301 (1937); Short v. Poole Corporation [1926]
Ch. 66; Fennell v. East Ham Corporation [1926] Ch. 641. Contra: State v.
Jefferson Parish School Board, 191 La. 102, 184 So. 555 (1938); McKay v. State,
212 Ind. 338, 7 N.E. (2d) 954 (1937); School Dist. of Wildwood v. State Board
of Education, 116 N.J. L. 572, 185 Atl. 664 (1936); Knoxville v. State, 133 S.W.
(2d) 465 (Tenn. 1939).
15. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed.
1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57
S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 1293 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307, 109 A.L.R. 1319 (1937).
16. In re Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E. (2d) 49, 62 (Mass. 1939).
17. In the field of private employment, legislation regulating the employment of women has been sustained on the ground that the state has an
interest in the protection of women, as women's health is a matter related
to public safety, public health, public morals, and public welfare. Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551, 13 Ann. Cas. 957 (1908); Riley
v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 34 S.Ct. 469, 58 L.Ed. 788 (1914); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628, L.R.A. 1915F, 829 (1915); Bosley
v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 35 S.Ct. 345, 59 L.Ed. 632 (1915); Radice v. New
York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690 (1924); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937).
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Louisiana is the only state having an act which prohibits dual
employments of both spouses only when their combined salary
exceeds a designated sum.18 The Louisiana act is similar to two
of the proposed Massachusetts bills which provided that husband
and wife should not at the same time be employed by the state
or any subdivision thereof.'9 The Massachusetts court held that
such bills would discriminate against a particular class of married persons as opposed to all other persons, married or unmarried. A person married to a state employee will not likely be
in less need of employment than would a single person or a person married to one not employed by the government. However,
the Massachusetts bills differ in two respects from the Louisiana
act: By the provisions of the Louisiana act a state employee will
not be discharged unless either his salary or that of his spouse
amounts to $100 a month or more;20 also the obvious effect of the
two Massachusetts bills construed in connection with the provisions of the other bills was to bar married women, as any man
employed by the state would in all probability be deemed to be
capable of supporting his wife. However, despite the dissimilarities between the Massachusetts bills and the Louisiana act, it is
submitted that there is no fundamental constitutional distinction
between the two statutory schemes, and that the cogent and wellreasoned conclusions of the Massachusetts high court are applic21
able to the Louisiana statute.
18. La. Act 15 of 1940 (E.S.).
In Tennessee by House Resolution, married women whose husbands earn
$150 a month or have sufficient property to provide an independent income
are barred from state employment. (House Resolution No. 18, Tenn. Pub.
Acts (1935) 452.) The Texas Senate adopted the House concurrent resolution
prohibiting both spouses from working for the state if their combined salaries exceeded $175 a month. Utah adopted a compromise resolution whereby
in giving state employment, the state would take into consideration whether
the other members of the family were employed, but the University of Utah
and the Industrial Commission refused to administer it. In April 1939 the
Governor of Alabama issued an order prohibiting employment by the state
of both husband and wife. There have been twenty-two states in all which
have contemplated such acts, but most of the bills were killed in committee,
or were rejected by the Legislature. This information was obtained from an
unpublished pamphlet secured from the National Federation, of Business and
Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., 1819 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
19. House Bills Nos. 556 and 707, § 5 cited in In re Opinion of the Justices,
22 N.E. (2d) 49, 54, 58 (1939).
20. La. Act 15 of 1940 (E.S.).
21. In Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed.
685 (1938), it was held that the right of a permanent teacher to continued
employment under the Indiana Tenure Act was contractual and that a repeal
of the act in its application to certain townships was an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligation of contract. Cf. Phelps v. Board of Education,
300 U.S. 319, 57 S.Ct. 483, 81 L.Ed. 674 (1937); Dodge v. Board of Education,
302 U.S. 74, 58 S.Ct. 93, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1938). The Anderson decision has a very
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Although there is no constitutional right to public employment, the constitutions both of the states and the United States
should guarantee to every citizen the privilege of competing for
any public employment, provided he or she is capable of performing the duties required. Assumption of a marital status should
not disqualify one from entering into or continuing in the public
service as a public employee, since such status bears no relationship whatever to ability. It would be a dangerous public policy
indeed to assume that marriage renders one unfit to perform
duties of a public nature, or that one's ability to serve the state
or the nation is hampered by assuming marital obligations.
J.G.C.
definite bearing on the general applicability of La. Act 15 of 1940 (E.S.) to
the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in
view of its policy of giving permanent tenure to professors who have served
under contract for two years.
The affairs of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College are placed under the administration of the Board of Supervisors by Sec. 7 of Art. XII of the Const. of 1921 and La. Act 7 of 1921
(E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2507-2511]. From the authority conferred by
this act and the constitutional provisions the Board of Supervisors can contract and do all acts for the benefit of the University which are incident to
bodies corporate. Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La. 826, 147 So.
5 (1933). Since the tenure policy of the University was adopted by the Board
of Supervisors by virtue of constitutional authority, it is also questionable
whether any act of the legislature can modify the terms of any contracts
made by the Board itself.
In the Attorney General's opinion of Feb. 27, 1940 relating to the application of La. Act 15 of 1940 (E.S.) to persons employed by the Board of
Supervisors of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as members of the faculty and staff, it was stated that under
the tenure policy of the University no contract was created between the
University and the professors since such a contract was subject to a potestative condition (Art. 2034, La. Civil Code of 1870) and consequently null: that
is, ". .. it gives the professor who has served for two years a tenure for life
provided his behavior is good, but it does not obligate him to continue to
serve for life. Regulations or statutes creating such tenures do not create
contractual obligations, for the obligations created by them are subject to
a potestative condition, since the continued execution of them is dependent
on the will of the employee. . . . Therefore, the professor is not bound to
continue to serve for the rest of his life, and as he is not bound to continue
to serve for the rest of his life, the Board cannot be contractually bound to
continue to employe him for the rest of his life." Opinion of the Att'y Gen.
of La. (Feb. 27, 1940). It is submitted, however, that one of the inducements
for a professor to accept a position on the University faculty is the promise
of the University to employe him for life if he is acceptable at the expiration
of a two years' probation period. The professor's consent to come to the
University constitutes consideration for the University's promise of life
tenure after the expiration of two years. If the University's promise of life
tenure is thus supported by independent and adequate consideration, the
fact that the professor does not bind himself to serve for life is unimportant.
Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73, 110 So. 93 (1926); S. Gumbel Realty & Securities Co. v. Levy, 156 So. 70 (La. App. 1934).
To further support his contention, the Attorney General relies on Art.
167, La. Civil Code of 1870, which prohibits terms of employment for a longer

